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The rise of regionalism after the Cold War as a positive phenomenon – leading to economic, political and security cooperation 
in a geographically defined area – is waning with the 
rise of nationalist and protectionist trends in global 
politics, as evidenced by the election of Donald 
Trump and the United Kingdom’s decision to leave 
the EU. Nevertheless, regionalism continues to occur 
in varying forms and varying degrees of complexity 
and deserves scholarly attention, particularly in 
times of dramatic change, as in the post-arab Spring 
Middle East. The question of what types of regional 
order and governance have prevailed in the Middle 
East following the first demonstrations in Tunisia 
in December 2010 has become a global concern. 
additionally, the questions of what is regional and 
what is global have become even more perplexing 
given that the post-arab Spring conflicts, such as the 
Syrian civil war, opened a pandora’s box of worldwide 
challenges, such as trans-border armed groups, 
migration and proxy wars. One hundred years after 
the rise of the post-Ottoman political order in the 
region, the Westphalian state system in the region is 
under increasing pressure, with an increasing number 
of fragile states, civil wars, violent non-state actors, 
sectarian tensions and new self-determination-
seeking regions. a power shift towards transnational, 
non-state and non-arab actors has gained further 
prominence since the arab Spring in 2011. Therefore, 
any review of regionalism in the Middle East must 
consider this growing shift along with the durability of 
most authoritarian states. 
‘ One hundred  
years after the  
rise of the  
post-Ottoman 
political order 
in the region, 
the Westphalian 
state system 
in the region is 
under increasing 
pressure, with 
an increasing 
number of fragile 
states, civil wars, 
violent non-state 
actors, sectarian 
tensions and new 
self-determination-
seeking regions.
’
InTroDUCTIon
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Considering the extent of change, with its 
global repercussions (such as the flow 
of refugees, and the rise of the islamic 
State), the arab Spring experience has 
also intensified academic discussions 
to better associate Middle Eastern 
developments with the main theoretical 
debates.1 in addition, there is a strong 
trend not to limit the study of the Middle 
East to the confines of existing theories, 
including the study of regionalism there. 
in this regard, louise Fawcet argues that 
viewing the region through either a realist 
or constructivist paradigm and then 
characterizing regional integration in the 
Middle East as “failed” because it does 
not exhibit “a Vinerian customs union 
or a Deutschian security community” is 
inappropriate.2 Encouragingly, a new, open-
minded view of regionalism in the Middle 
East that has adopted farther-reaching 
explanatory tools in the wake of the arab 
Spring has gained ground. Currently, 
combining transnational networks and 
interactions with the old form of state-
led regionalism seems the most viable 
means to elaborate the current state of 
regionalism in the region.3 Has the role of 
the state in regionalism lost further ground 
since the arab Spring? Have setbacks in 
interstate regionalism occurred with the 
rise of sectarian polarization since the 
arab Spring? are the usual operational 
patterns of regionalism changing with 
further fragmentation in the wake of 
the arab Spring? are new patterns of 
regionalization in the Middle East posing 
more varied and serious challenges to 
international society? all these questions 
represent important points of inquiry 
that require multilevel and multi-actor 
explanations in the effort to characterize 
the state of regionalism in the Middle East. 
 
FrAming regionAliSm in 
the middle eASt
The definition of “region” is essential for 
any regional analysis, including that of 
the Middle East. as with other regions, 
the Middle East is a constructed region 
whose geographical boundaries and level 
of region-ness are open to discussion. 
However, the most common geographical 
definition of the Middle East is the area 
that includes all the arab states and three 
non-arab states: israel, iran and Turkey. 
Because this paper addresses post-arab 
Spring regionalism, the focus will be 
on the state of regionalism in the arab 
Middle East. Similar to most regions of the 
world, the Middle East was first framed 
by strategic considerations and military 
concerns.4 Considering Europe’s colonial 
past, the course of the Cold War and the 
war on terror, it is hard to separate the 
idea of the Middle East “from the power 
and the knowledge created and imposed 
by the West on the rest of the world.”5 
The Middle East was first mentioned by 
this name in a 1902 article entitled “The 
persian Gulf and international relations” 
by american naval strategist alfred Thayer 
Mahan, who described the strategic value 
of the region for British imperial needs.6 
The term “Middle East” was adopted 
during the Second World War because the 
British referred to their forces in Egypt as 
the Middle East Command. 
       LSE IDEAS StrAtEgIc UpDAtE  |  April 20196
‘as with other 
regions, the 
Middle East  
is a constructed 
region whose 
geographical 
boundaries  
and level of 
region-ness  
are open  
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There has been a tendency to deemphasize the 
geographic elements of regions while focusing on 
political and ideational characteristics. according to 
J. peter Katzenstein, regions are “socially constructed 
and politically contested.”7 In defining regions, scholars 
underscore various qualifications for being or becoming 
a region. For instance, Bruce M. russett emphasized 
factors such as geographical proximity, social and 
cultural homogeneity, political institutions, and economic 
interdependence.8 in contrast, louis J. Cantori and 
Steven l. Spiegel regarded geographical contiguity; 
common historical, cultural, and linguistic bonds as 
well as international interactions as necessary to the 
definition of a region.9 Based on these qualities, where 
the Middle East stands is not clear. Considering cultural 
and religious commonalities, the Middle East has the 
potential to be regarded as a region. Various studies, 
such as the arab Human Development report 2002, 
have suggested that “perhaps no other group of states 
in the world has been endorsed with the same potential 
for cooperation, even integration, as have the arab 
countries” given that the area has a common historical 
experience and that the supranational arab-Muslim 
identity represents a relatively high degree of cultural, 
religious, and linguistic homogeneity.10 The region has 
also been defined by a significant degree of interaction 
based on extensive family ties across borders and the 
presence of transnational actors, including islamists, 
migrants, and informal business links.11 in addition, the 
emergence of transnational arab media such as al-Jazeera 
and al-arabiya has created a new arab public space.12 
However, there is a broad consensus in the literature that 
regionalism in the Middle East in the sense of social and 
political cohesiveness or economic interdependence – or 
the existence of region-wide institutions – is not a strong 
phenomenon.13 a scarcity of regional cooperation in the 
area has led to the Middle East being labelled “the region 
without regionalism” or a space of weak regionalism. 
The Middle East is often viewed as exceptional, resisting 
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global trends of economic and political 
liberalism as well as regionalism in the 
age of globalization14 For a long time, the 
absence of viable states, the authoritarian 
nature of arab states, and external 
penetration have been generally accepted 
as the reasons why region-building 
in the Middle East has been difficult. 
intraregional trade in the arab Middle East 
also displays a lack of complementarity 
as trade patterns consist of raw materials 
and agriculture. The large difference in 
GDp per capita between the Gulf states 
and the rest of the arab countries is also 
regarded as one of the reasons for failing 
economic unity.15 
 
regionAliSm or 
regionAlizAtion
Since WWi, the concept of an enduring 
national arab state has formed the basis 
of regional cooperation in the Middle 
East at the expense of sublevel or supra-
level cooperation. However, after the 
arab Spring, the fragmentation of states, 
as in Syria, Yemen, and libya, and the 
adverse impact of such fragmentation on 
neighbouring states weakened regional 
cooperation at the state level. protecting 
the territorial nation state gained even 
more urgency than previously. in addition, 
external initiatives that promoted regional 
schemes with the aim of coordinating 
regional security, such as the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership or the Greater 
Middle East, lost credibility and influence 
as alternatives to regionalism. However, 
in the early days of the arab Spring, the 
diffusing effects of street protests against 
autocratic rulers in Tunisia and Egypt 
on other arab countries raised hopes 
that the arab Middle East would see the 
beginning of a new era of regional unity. 
at the time, with a wave of synchronized 
demonstrations occurring across the 
region, the arab world seemed more 
unified than nearly any other time. This 
interconnectedness also revealed the 
numerous modes of engagement possible 
in the region, ranging from blog writing, 
artistic expression, and mass participation 
in demonstrations to transnational 
mobility.16 This interconnectedness 
through varied forms of networking 
among trans-state actors in the region 
has continued. Concurrently, viewing the 
state of regionalism in the Middle East in 
terms of the New Regionalism Approach 
(NRA) has become even more relevant to 
comprehending current and future forms 
of regionalism in the Middle East.17 as 
Björn Hettne and Frederick Söderbaum 
observe, the NRA’s definition of the region 
as a space open to reconstruction and the 
approach’s acceptance of a multiplicity of 
actors and different forms of regionalism 
could offer a better perspective from 
which to consider the arab Middle 
East.18 it seems that certain distinctions 
made in the literature regarding the 
conduct and processes of regional 
cooperation – such as regionalism 
and regionalization – are relevant to 
better comprehending regionalism in 
the context of the arab Middle East. in 
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discussing the multifaceted experience of 
regionalism in various regions, regionalism 
and regionalization are two concepts 
that are often used to characterize 
different forms and stages of regional 
cooperation and interaction. Examining 
intra-regional relations beyond the state 
has become particularly necessary and 
more explanatory since the arab Spring. 
Studying the intensity and variety of 
transnational interactions as opposed 
to worsening inter-state cooperation 
in the context of weakening territorial 
nation states, scholars have begun to 
understand the Middle East as an area of 
dynamic regionalization but also as a poor 
example of interstate regionalism.19 While 
regionalism is generally understood as 
a state- or states-led project designed to 
reorganize a particular regional space along 
defined economic, institutional, and political 
lines, regionalization, in contrast, defines 
more spontaneous, bottom-up, endogenous 
processes, which involve non-state actors 
in a variety of networks.20 The two concepts 
are interwoven and hard to differentiate. 
However, regionalization and regionalism 
are perceived differently in terms of the 
actors who are involved, their inclusion 
of top-down or bottom-up initiatives, 
and their attention to the outcome or 
procedure. Nevertheless, there is no such 
thing as state-led regionalism as opposed 
to non-state-led regionalism. regional 
orders encompass both regionalization 
and regional institutions. Therefore, the 
question is no longer whether regionalism 
occurs in the Middle East but what form it is 
adopting or what characteristics it displays. 
WeAkening StAte-led 
regionAliSm viS-à-viS 
increASing neW FormS  
oF regionAlizAtion 
prior to the arab Spring, globalization had 
already strained nation-state capacity in 
the Middle East, as it had everywhere. 
after 2011, it became even harder for 
authoritarian arab states to control the 
flow of ideas, goods and people through 
porous borders. The arab Spring split the 
regional states into three: “The arab Spring 
countries (Tunisia, Egypt, libya, Yemen 
and Syria), the countries that withstood 
the arab Spring (Saudi arabia, UaE, 
Qatar)” and the countries that introduced 
constitutional reform (Morocco, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Bahrain).21 Meanwhile, interstate 
regionalism in the form of regional 
organizations had to come to terms with 
the unprecedented outcomes of the arab 
uprisings. Following the uprisings in 
2011, the two leading representatives of 
inter-state regionalism, the arab league 
and the GCC, initially reassessed their 
standing and tried to improve their image 
while adjusting themselves to the region’s 
changing political dynamics.22 The first 
formal regional organization in the Middle 
East – the arab league – came into being 
in 1945. The arab league was initially 
founded by Egypt, iraq, Jordan, lebanon, 
Saudi arabia, Syria, and Yemen. it currently 
has 22 member states and is based on 
a shared culture and language with the 
aim of serving the common good of all 
arab states. State-centred regionalism in 
the Middle East has always been on the 
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defence vis-à-vis strong sub-state (i.e., sectarian, ethnic) 
and supra-state (i.e., arab, Muslim) identities. However, 
for example, having the feeling of Arabness has not led 
to a common understanding regarding common norms 
that each arab state should adopt. Even the strong appeal 
of arab nationalism (pan-arabism) during Gamel abdel 
Nasser’s reign did not result in cross-national unity. as 
Michael Barnett notes, shared supra-state identities do 
not necessarily promote regional cooperation as long as 
inward-looking state survival takes priority.23 as a regional 
organization, the arab league was awarded only limited 
autonomy by its member states, which preferred not 
to delegate any supreme role to the organization at the 
expense of national sovereignty. as stated in the Charter of 
the league, state sovereignty was a priority for any member 
state, and each state undertook not to intervene in one 
another’s regime-related issues.24 The existing cooperation 
among the authoritarian states of the arab league is 
defined as “authoritarian regionalism” or “regime-boosting 
regionalism,” in which the status, legitimacy, and general 
interests of arab regimes are strengthened through the 
league at the expense of genuine regional cooperation.25 
regarding these circumstances, Charles Tripp states that 
leaders who are unwilling to make compromises with 
domestic constituencies appear similarly unwilling to make 
compromises with neighbouring states.26 Other than its 
rare contribution to regional cooperation, the arab league 
has generally remained incompetent in resolving regional 
crises. With the exception of the israel issue, league 
members are also rarely united on critical issues. The 
league’s capabilities in terms of regionalism were put to a 
new test by the arab Spring. 
When the arab uprisings erupted in 2011, the major 
concern of the member states was how to stop these 
waves of public empowerment. although resistance to 
authoritarianism was evident, there were no mechanisms 
to inspire or support democratic transition in the area, 
as experienced in the relationship between the European 
Union (EU) and post-Soviet Europe in the aftermath 
‘While 
regionalism 
is generally 
understood as  
a state- 
or states-led 
project designed 
to reorganize 
a particular 
regional space 
along defined 
economic, 
institutional, and 
political lines, 
regionalization, 
in contrast, 
defines more 
spontaneous, 
bottom-up, 
endogenous 
processes, which 
involve non-state 
actors in a variety 
of networks. ’
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of 1989. Their own stability and national security 
became the leading concern for the member states 
of the league. For instance, when the libyan crisis 
erupted, the League first seemed quite engaged and 
took a radical decision to become involved in the 
internal affairs of an arab country at the expense 
of its charter, subsequently taking the matter to the 
UN Security Council. This decision resulted in UN 
resolutions 1970 and 1973, which authorized military 
intervention against the Qaddafi regime. Despite this 
unusual over-involvement at the expense of non-
intervention, the league has been gradually sidelined 
by superior US and European involvements, including 
the massive NaTO bombardment of libya. The arab 
league was initially also active with respect to Syria, 
suspending Syria’s membership based on assad’s 
policy towards Syrian civilians and dispatching joint 
observer missions with the UN in 2012 and 2013.27 
it also proposed a peace plan for Syria. However, it 
fell short of providing an arab solution to the Syrian 
civil war, and Syria increasingly became “a disgrace” 
to the league after its early engagement.28 as the 
islamic State of iraq and Syria (iSiS), iran, russia and 
other external forces were gaining defining influence 
in Syria, the league remained ineffective. The league 
focused on protecting the surviving regimes among 
its member states and their allies. Consequently, the 
league announced the formation of a joint military 
force consisting of approximately 40,000 troops in 
2015, which was a novelty in the face of increasing 
security concerns in Yemen.29 Saudi arabia heavily 
supported this decision. Saudi arabia’s desire to return 
to the pre-arab Spring status quo caused it to intervene 
in Bahrain in February 2011 and Yemen in 2015 and 
also to extend support to local opposition groups in 
Syria.30 These Saudi-led military interventions were 
overlooked by the arab league regardless of the non-
intervention principle that is addressed in the Charter 
of the league. as shown by the Saudi case, regional 
power intervention and outside-power intervention in 
‘as the islamic 
State of iraq 
and Syria, iran, 
russia and other 
external forces 
were gaining 
defining influence 
in Syria, the 
league remained 
ineffective. The 
league focused 
on protecting the 
surviving regimes 
among its 
member states 
and their allies.
’
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arab conflicts, directly or indirectly through 
proxy groups, have gained momentum.
in addition to the arab league, another 
institutionalized regional actor required 
to test its capacity by post-arab Spring 
conditions and display its ability to counter 
the challenges of this new regional 
architecture was the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC). The GCC was founded as 
a sub-regional organization in 1981 as 
a result of security concerns regarding 
possible adverse impacts of the 1979 
iranian revolution. Until the recent Saudi 
arabia-Qatar confrontations, the GCC, 
which includes Saudi arabia, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar, the UaE, and Oman, had 
been accepted as the best example 
of interstate regionalism in the Middle 
East.31 However, this transformation was 
destined to fail in the post-arab Spring 
period. after the weakening of the political 
status of Egypt and the fragmentation 
of libya and Syria after the arab Spring, 
the Gulf region has increasingly become 
the dominant subregion in the Middle 
East.32 Nevertheless, this development 
did not boost regionalism in the Gulf 
but gave way to new political tensions 
and exacerbated old sectarian tensions 
between neighbours.
Saudi arabia attempted to mobilize 
Sunni arab countries under its hegemony 
against the rise of the iran-led Shia bloc, 
particularly in the context of the regional 
sectarian divide (i.e., the so-called New 
arab Cold War), but failed to succeed. 
The sectarian clash with iran did not 
result in intra-Sunni unity either. Diverging 
threat perceptions regarding iran and 
the Muslim Brotherhood created the 
most serious rupture between Saudi 
arabia and Qatar within the GCC and put 
the most-praised regional organization 
into the worst disarray in its 38-year 
history. Not only the sectarian divide but 
also the fragmentation among Sunni 
Muslims regarding support for the Muslim 
Brotherhood or Salafi groups distorted 
Sunni arab solidarity and undermined 
islam as a source of unity for the region. 
Qatar declined to designate the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a terrorist organization 
despite the contrary views of Saudi 
arabia and the GCC. in 2017, Bahrain, 
Saudi arabia and the UaE announced that 
they had cut all relations with Qatar and 
imposed a boycott against the country. 
Meanwhile, bilateralism has gained further 
importance in the region at the expense of 
regionalism. riyadh turned to the US and 
sought to strengthen its military ties with 
Washington.33 Not only regional states but 
also their Western interlocutors, the US 
and the EU increasingly, prefer bilateralism 
to multilateralism in the region at the 
expense of regionalism. Contrary to its 
enthusiasm regarding the arab uprisings in 
their early months, the EU soon perceived 
the authoritarian regimes of the MENa 
region “as indispensable allies in the fight 
against terrorism and irregular migration 
by Europeans.”34 The nation state’s 
prioritization of its own security and the 
increasing securitization of regional affairs 
have undermined the already weak state-
led regionalism even further. 
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regionAlizAtion in  
the PoSt-ArAb SPring 
middle eASt
Since the onset of the arab Spring, a 
new type of regionalization based on the 
increase in refugees, non-state armed 
groups and trans-border sectarian 
identification has gained momentum in 
the region. at the beginning of the arab 
uprisings across the region, there was 
an emerging hope regarding the region’s 
improvement in terms of adopting the 
international liberal order as individuals 
from all walks of life, including young 
activists, trade unionists, members of 
the middle class, women, students and 
islamists, united to raise their voices 
against economic deprivation, political 
repression, corruption and injustice. 
The slogans that addressed bread and 
freedom in Tahrir Square were nearly 
identically echoed in the main squares 
of other arab Spring countries.35 
Surveys conducted at the peak of the 
demonstrations in 2011 revealed that a 
vast majority of respondents believed 
in “the existence of a united arab nation 
bond.”36 The arab Spring was not the work 
of any particular political or ideological 
orientation, and the eruption of the arab 
Spring was not a moment of victory for 
either the pan-arab or islamist trend.37 it 
is also important to note that this uprising 
was a bottom-up phenomenon that was 
quite different from previous uprisings 
led by particular authoritarian leaders or 
military officers.38 Meanwhile, in addition 
to the classically organized forms of civil 
society, such as well-known NGOs in the 
area, new forms of civil society activism 
were observed and awarded the new 
name “activated citizenship” throughout 
the arab Spring protests.39 Traditional, 
long-standing civil society groups were not 
as active as expected in the anti-regime 
demonstrations. The emergence of civil 
society activism in the Middle East during 
the 1990s was regarded as a positive sign 
of democratization, but such activism 
remained ineffective in challenging 
state authoritarianism. Civil society 
organisations either remained under the 
direct control of “respective governments 
as government organized NGOs or operate 
within tight governmental supervision.”40 
During the arab Spring, it was also clearly 
demonstrated that “open and horizontal” 
features of social media provided 
previously marginalized groups, such 
as youth, women and ethnic minorities 
in the MENa region, a new “arab public 
sphere.”41 Unfortunately, the widening arab 
space that was enthusiastically greeted 
during the arab Spring did not become 
a smooth, negotiated form of regional 
cooperation for a common cause. The 
arab streets lacked a common leadership, 
means and even a common vision with 
which to create a real transformation. in 
contrast, in the wake of the arab Spring, 
conflict has also become an important 
cause of the increasing mobility of 
individuals from all social classes and 
professions. For example, the post-arab 
Spring developments have enforced a new 
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‘The proliferation 
of non-state 
actors and 
transnational 
armed groups 
and the rise of 
multi-layered 
tribal, ethnic and 
sectarian identity 
beyond the state 
has resulted 
in a search for 
new forms of 
organization and 
cooperation for 
the Middle East.
’
form of regionalization via the increasing number of 
refugees. The neighbouring countries of the conflict 
regions in the Middle East have faced large numbers 
of forced migrants, as has been most evident after 
the Syrian civil war. in addition, regionalization in the 
form of expanding cross-border radicalization is on 
the rise. Both cooperative and conflictive regional 
dynamics are simultaneously in play. all political and 
military developments in nearly all critical regional 
issues are heavily influenced by several non-state 
armed actors, including Hamas, Hezbollah, iSiS, 
the pKK and the pYD. The proliferation of non-state 
actors and transnational armed groups and the rise 
of multi-layered tribal, ethnic and sectarian identity 
beyond the state has resulted in a search for new 
forms of organization and cooperation for the Middle 
East. The rise of new modes of regionalization driven 
by civil wars through transnational armed groups 
and unprecedented refugee flows pose additional 
security challenges for territorial nation states in 
the Middle East. The on-going civil wars and their 
region-wide repercussions have made the region 
more interconnected in a negative sense since these 
repercussions are deeply felt and observed not only in 
the region but also around the world. However, signs 
of cooperative intraregional mobility should not cause 
one to overlook the dual character of regionalization. 
The regionalization of cultural productions in the 
arab world, such as arab literature and cinema, are 
continuing to make arab peoples increasingly more 
aware of the arab regional space. in addition, migrant 
workers remain an important bond among arab states. 
as leila Vignal notes, constraints on transnational 
mobility in the Middle East “by the lack of physical 
transportation infrastructures, by limited personal 
financial resources and by border regimes, conflicts” 
are tough, but regionalization is on the move.42
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concluSion
it seems that regionalization is increasing at the expense 
of regionalism in the arab Middle East. While the Middle 
East might not be a region without regionalism but one of 
increasing human contacts, transnational movements and 
a variety of non-state actors, it seems that these signs of 
high-level regionalization are failing to contribute to better 
regional cooperation for a common cause but, rather, to 
conflict and tension. The arab Spring has made the region 
more interconnected despite the on-going civil wars and their 
region-wide repercussions. Meanwhile, the old form of state 
regionalism, the arab league and the GCC, has continued 
to underperform and remain ineffective. Different regional 
players have different visions of regional order. iSiS is seeking 
a caliphate that would abolish all nation-state borders, whereas 
borderland regions are becoming quasi-independent by asking 
for self-determination. Non-arab regional states, such as iran 
and Turkey, have started to become more involved in arab 
affairs, as clearly indicated by their intervention in the Syrian 
civil war. Despite too much talk of islam and islamism inside 
and outside the region, both the sectarian divide between Shia 
and Sunni and the fragmentation among Sunni Muslims have 
distorted islamic solidarity. Traditional issues of common 
regional concern, such as palestine, have been sidelined by 
increasing attention paid to larger issues, such as Syria.43 
Witnessing great-power rivalry, such as US-russian tests of 
strength over Syria, is causing polarization among regional 
states by pressuring them to take sides. For the foreseeable 
future, multifaceted, novel forms of regionalism may continue 
to appear with multilayered levels of regional cooperation, 
transnational diffusion or unwanted forms of regionalization 
in the region. in this context, the Middle East continues to be 
a region not easily associated with cooperation or integration. 
Considering all the uncertainties and challenges ahead for the 
region, we would do well to recall Fawcett’s reminder that “there 
is no ideal region, nor any single agenda to which all regions 
aspire. regions, like states, are of varying compositions, 
capabilities  aspirations.”44  
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